achievements of the board in its primary function of enlisting the cooperation of American scholars in ''furnish1 ing] to Government war agencies, military and civilian, needed information of all sorts relating to any areas outside the United States where military, economic, or other action is carried on or planned."4 But to facilitate the harnessing of this information, a crucial realignment of the disciplinary nature of academic knowledge had first been required: "This brings up a major problem faced by the Board, namely that Government agencies . . . operate in terms of areas, while universities, councils, and foundations are organized by disciplines. Again it was necessary to translate the discipline knowledge into the geographical categories used by the Government."5 In effect, Bennett was describing the founding institutional moment of "the area approach": a moment above all constituted by the exigencies of politics and strategy as scholars sought to respond to the needs of a government at war.
Yet scarcely had area studies been launched on their path to expansion as a part of the wartime national mobilization than Robert Redfield was declaring the necessity of their fundamental reformulation.h Speaking at the Social Science Research Council offices in April 1944, he said, "I suggest that we discuss how we are to organize area programs only after we are sure why we are to do so. T h e ends of universities are not the same as the ends of the wartime area programs. T h e ends of the university are education and research. T h e ends of the wartime programs are training and more train i ng."7
Redfield was calling for the extraction of the area studies model from the political conditions of its birth. H e recognized that wartime area programs had been effective in producing certain specific and pragmatically oriented kinds of knowledge (especially linguistic). But if area studies were to survive as a legitimate framework for the organization of academic research and teaching, they would have to be reabsorbed into the logic of the university. Only then could they be adequate institutional sites for the production of scientific knowledge that could be both objective and socially valuable.
What, though, would such a reabsorption look like? Where did the role of area studies lie in postwar American academia?
Area Studies and Education
To be legitimate in the sense of being scientifically objective, knowledge had to be produced free of the operations of power: This was supposedly the very raison d'etre of the independent social site of the university. Social science had a higher calling than the pragmatic demands of governments. "In effect," Redfield declared in 1947, "social science is a new instrument, not only for the getting of certain specific things done in the management of society, but for the clarification and development of our more ultimate values."8 H e was insistent that social science could not identify narrowly with policy or strategy if it was to remain true to its "single principle of beingthe search for an ordered understanding, for its own sake."" This did not, however, mean that social science could have no legitimating purposes outside of this immanent drive, but rather that it could only properly serve such functions if it remained faithful to itself. So, for example, social science's capacity for objective criticism made it an invaluable voice of the public sphere.10 More fundamentally still, and in opposition to the state-centered, "policy" conception of its role, this same capacity also gave it a heavy responsibility, in the form of education, to develop in students the requisite qualities to themselves play a meaningful role as citizens. " Redfield had joined the debate on the role of the social sciences in "general education" in the 1930s. In a confusingly complex world where the "contrary winds of doctrine blow," social science "equip[ sl a young person with the viewpoint and methods of scholarship and science for use on the subject matter with which his life as a man and a citizen is most closely involved [ i.e., human behavior and institutions]." These critical capacities were powerful weapons of "truth" with which to resist the temptations of " i 1 1 i be r a 1 pol it ic a 1 -ec o n om ic dogmas ." 1 * Soc i a 1 science i n se r t ed free a n d rational thought into the gap created by the modern fragmentation of cultural integration and continuity. It asserted "the more general and comprehensive values of our society against the more limited and special interests and values," in order that "the mind and spirit of each one of us be liberated from the narrowness of the particular into the interests and excitements of the general."13 T h e task of general education was, then, the production of liberal American citizen-subjects with a genuine grasp of the processes of objective reason: "Shown the general, we are liberated from the tyranny of the particular. I am not merely I; I am an instance of a natural law."14 Furthermore, general education's ideals of reason and intellectual freedom turn out to be none other than "the American way":
As a people we are strongly in favour of reasonableness rather than force.
We have faith in persuasion resulting from open competition of ideas.
We have embodied freedom of speech and thought in one of our most solemn and ruling documents. . . . Of all freedoms we are proudest of the freedom of the mind. And it is in the university, above all places, where this freedom is most consistently exercised. . . . So it is especially in the university that this important part of the common values is cultivated and preserved from tyranny, from cowardice, and from ignorance. T h e professor, because his virtue derives from his work, is constantly maintaining and defending the freedom of thought, the reliance upon reason and special knowledge, in which we all believe. 15 T h e university was, then, the place where America was most itself precisely by being at its least parochial there. America, freedom, truth, the university: By virtue of being a scholar, one was both patriot and cosmopolitan. 16 Redfield countenanced the postwar proliferation of Western civilization courses for their aims of "communicating and restating important parts of our own heritage and . . . developing a common responsibility to realize common values."l7 But he felt that this emphasis needed to be supplemented by a second important focus. Redfield argued that a thorough acquaintance with another culture was a crucial part of a general education: "Merely because each one of us, with few exceptions, grows up in one of these [ integrated] cultures and by this fact is limited in his understanding of his own conduct and that of other people, the coming to know another culture than our own should be a great liberalizing experience."Ig Not only does this allow one to discover a respect for other cultures as coherent and meaningful for those who live within them, but it also allows for a newly critical and rational estimation of the ideas and institutions of one's own culture. Ultimately, the "understanding had of the unfamiliar culture.. . must reach the point where the educated individual begins to think how he would act in given situations if that other culture were his own." At that point "one sees human nature freshly."lY T h e alien culture at first appears to us like a mask, enigmatic and repugnant. O n closer acquaintance we see it as a garment for the spirit. . . .
Finally, as acquaintance goes deeper still, we do not see, o r for a time forget, the culture but look only to the common humanity of the men and women beneath. . . . It is a task of education to provide a viewpoint from which the educated person may free himself from the limitations of these preconceptions. We are all islanders to begin with. An acquaintance with another culture, a real and deep acquaintance, is a release of the mind and the spirit from that isolation. It is to learn a universal language.20
If the role of social science in education is to secure the release of the citizen into the interests of the general through the cultivation of a rational and critical consciousness of society, the acquaintance with otherness is the next step in this process. T h e mission of cross-cultural knowledge turns out to be none other than that of securing a truly universal "viewpoint" for the American citizen-subject. Securing a critical distance from American parochialisms opens a truly global perspective for that subject; for it is the peculiar privilege of the American liberal subject that by transcending its parochialism as American it becomes only more true to the universalism that underpins its identity. At the same time, these same parochialisms, having been subjected to such scrutiny by the critical consciousness, become once again available for recuperation as socially integrative "culture."21 However, in order for area programs to play such a role, an appropriate body of literature had to be available; and Redfield was doubtful of the adequacy to the purpose of existent studies. If area programs were indeed to fulfill their potential role in general education, the gap between the literature available on "the West" (the newly reforged identity of Western Europe and North America) and that available on the rest of the world would have to be bridged. As Redfield put it in 1944:
When we have carried on long and intensive study of the economics, government, sociology, anthropology, history, and arts of Russia, China, India, and Latin America, and have brought these different disciplines into considered relation to one another with reference to each of these regions, then we shall have in our understanding of these other parts of the world a basis for general education comparable with what is provided by our knowledge of Western Europe and some of its offshoots.22
What we have here is perhaps the first statement of a program that seven years later would be realized as the comparative civilizations project, Redfield's most sustained attempt to help reframe the interests of the international scholarly community and thereby participate in the reconstruction of the social and political imagination of the postwar United States.
Today, questions are being raised about the long-term viability of area studies programs. Redfield is one of the friendlier liberal faces in Cold War area studies, and his project therefore provides an ideal history through which to begin a critical interrogation into the foundations of these programs (without allowing us to salve our consciences with too-easy ideological distancing). Carl Pletsch was certainly right to reject the idea that intellectuals like Redfield were simply co-opted by government as ideologists.
O n the other hand, though, it is too simple to suggest that Redfield was merely a victim of the constraints of the Three Worlds concept in spite of himself, due to some kind of intellectual failure of nerve or funding compromise, contradicting the general thrust of his humanistic impulses.
Rather, let us recognize that Redfield's role as an opponent of the Cold War and a partisan of the third world articulated readily with what Pletsch described as the "deep structure" of Cold War social scientific discourse: the first world, as rational society, standing opposed to the second world, which is distorted by ideological domination, and to the third world of irrational cultural particularity/deviance.23 Redfield's anthropological project and his critical stance were fundamentally generated out of this same structural identification.
T h e importance Redfield claimed for the social science/area studies projects was precisely a function of the political urgency implicit in the Cold War discursive "deep structure" he was deploying. It was by being able to understand cultural difference that Redfield was able to transcend parochialism. It was by being above the ideological partisanship of overt Cold War rhetoric that he anchored his objectivity.24 Supplementing the social sciences' innate powers of ideological critique, area studies were to provide the ultimate guarantee of the adequacy of the American liberal subject and his o r her values to universality by finally liberating him or her from the limits of ethnocentrism. In their educational role, area studies were to be a powerful agent in the reinforcement of the universalism at the heart of first-world modernity. In their representational role, they would, at the same time as mapping the world for the American gaze, reaffirm both the parochialism of cultures and the general historical tendency on the part of all societies to participate in the universalisms the American liberal subject stood for. Redfield's slippery equation of freedom, truth, and America is precisely the point at which we can locate the ideological nature of his intellectual project, while the crucial addition of the university into this system of identifications will be seen to give rise to some major claims about the privileged role of the reflective intellectual in liberal society. Against the anthropologist's acute recognition, in the face of the beginnings of decolonization, that all societies are culturally particular, and against also the liberal fear that Cold War America was drifting towards ideological rigidity, Redfield pitted the university's claim to be able to bolster the nation's status as a rational society. Neither ideologically nor culturally bound, the Redfieldian vision of the educated American was to be a figure adequate to global responsibility.
The Ford Foundation Cultural Studies Proiect
By 1949, when the ethnographic phase of Redfield's career was more or less finished, Redfield's interest in the more general question of developing a coherent approach to non-Western civilizations had blossomed to the extent that he was proposing the establishment of an institute of cultural studies. Writing on Redfield's behalf, his friend Robert Hutchins, the chancellor of the University of Chicago, approached both the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation for funding. T h e envisioned institute would explore issues of cultural diversity and the universally human in a way that was both to be primarily intellectually oriented and to have the more pragmatic aims of producing a substantial body of social-scientific knowledge vital to the reconceptualization of an increasingly postimperial world of U.S. ( Thus was born the Ford Foundation Cultural Studies Project, an international, cooperative program based at the university of Chicago. In the words of the press release:
In this work Professor Redfield has associated himself with Professor Milton Singer of the University of Chicago and Professor Eliseo Vivas of Northwestern University. These men are together trying to understand and to improve the means used by science and scholarship to describe and compare the important cultures, the great and enduring traditions, of mankind. T h e central question that guides the work is: What can validly be said as to the basic resemblances and differences among the principal traditional life-ways now important in the human community?
T h e effort is to bring into mutual influence. . . studies of particular cultures . . . and studies of the methodological or philosophical problems of characterizing and comparing cultures.2* It was an enormous project that involved, to begin with, the most basic process of learning what work was already out there, of "systematically reviewing and testing basic concepts and methods" that might provide "a set of co-ordinates" within which to order and evaluate existent studies as well as organize future work, and of enlisting the cooperation of specialists who worked in relevant fields.*' To this last end-of establishing contacts-Redfield himself undertook extensive travel around the world, primarily to Europe, but also, in 1955, to India, which (through Milton Singer's influence) increasingly became the focus of the program's attention.
Anthropologists had, of course, an important part to play in the project, though civilizations were clearly unconventionally large and complex social objects to be studied in terms of traditional anthropological methods. Redfield had, however, been strongly influenced by his early exposure to sociology at the University of Chicago (where the two disciplines formed a single department until 1929), especially through his prominent father-inlaw, Robert Park; and his first work, Tepoztlan, had on its publication in 1930 struck many anthropologists as a '"sociological' departure from traditional ethnographic approaches."31 It is not so surprising, then, that he now determined to apply anthropological techniques to problems not usually considered within their purview. H e felt that anthropology could offer an insight through its on-the-ground, bottom-up perspective, allowing one to "see a civilization in vivo-within the contexts of family, neighbours, work, ceremonies, and other circumstances that make up the round of life of a people."32 At the same time, though, his search for specialists went far beyond the discipline of anthropology. Redfield was not only seeking the assistance "of students of particular ingredients of civilization (language and literature, philosophy, religion, art, science, etc.)."33 After all, there did already exist a large number of experts around the world working in the longestablished Orientalist disciplines, the "students of the world's major civilizations (Sinologists, Islamicists, Indologists)."34 Several of the most author- T h e study of civilizations is a field unevenly divided between humanists and social scientists. T h e former tend to look to the past of a civilization, usually to its "classical period,*' the latter tend to look to its present. . . . As long as the humanist refuses to take the present seriously and ignores the life of the little people of the villages, and as long as the social scientist disdains "library research" and fails to connect his work with the study of the developments of the common life in high art and in the educated thinker's deliberate cultivation and improvement of values, the picture of a civilization which either draws must remain incomplete.37
Project funds were therefore directed toward encouraging forums for discussions among such scholars and toward the publication of the papers of several such symposia in the project's monograph series, Comparative Studies of Culture and Civilization.
T h e purpose of Redfield's project as stated in his first progress report submitted in 1952 was to "affect the work of scholars and scientists so that their characterizations and comparisons of the great contemporary civilizations become more valid and significant.*'38 T h e anticipated payoff of this was to be the "improvement of understanding of the persisting and influential characteristics of the principal cultures of mankind and of the humanity that is common to them a11. "3Y To this end, time and moneys would be directed in three general directions: critical reviews of studies of particular cultures, and of the problems of characterizing and comparing them; the substantive scholarly development of the particular fields of cultural studies; and stimulating and supporting particular studies where these promised to significantly advance understanding of the characterization and comparability of cultures.
In summary, the project is one to advance, in places to be discovered and in ways largely to be developed, the movement toward common understanding among the peoples of mankind at the level of systematic thought brought into relation with special knowledge of scientist and scholar. It holds a hope of modifying in some degree the separateness with which study of Western Civilization has been carried on, and of supplementing, through a more central vision, the efforts made in UNESCO and elsewhere to develop a world community of ideas.40
In other words, to provide a site for the reconfiguration of the various social and human knowledges such as to displace an older imperial vision of a unitary cultural center (Europe) in favor of a cartography of formally equivalent civilizational entities of which Western civilization was now but one.
If the American citizen-subject was to be educated to be globally conscious, the globe had to be transformed into an object knowable by such a consciousness. The search for comparability was precisely the search for ; i principle of formal equivalence which would guarantee the knowability of the globe through procedures that were universalistic even as they aimed to conceptualize a cartographically arranged order of difference. And this universalist framework was itself underpinned on the one hand by the heightened reflexivity of the Western intellectual who conceptualized it, and on the other hand by an underlying "humanity that is common" to all mankind.41 Through this tension-fraught device was produced a world ecumene which-by the very fact that it was enabled by a social science that embodied, above all, the values of America-could not but find in the United States its ultimate safeguard. This was true even when this social science was by no means practiced exclusively by Americans, for it was in the maximally cosmopolitan composition of the scholarly community that its ambitions to transcend particularity of culture were best ensured. 43 Redfield positioned the intellectual at the heart of the negotiation of the eruptive political issues of cultural difference.43 His justification for the comparative civilizations project relied heavily on a rhetoric of the possible "contributions of cultural studies to world peace and understanding." Such contributions included their capacity to "interpret the ideological and cultural conflicts between the Orient and Occident"; to qualify the exclusivity of nationalisms through an emphasis on transnational (religious, linguistic, ideological) identities; to help better understand the consequences "of improved material productivity, now so much sought, to the underlying values" of the great traditions; and to recognize "common elements of value in the different traditions making for a world community."44
T h e encounter of diverse cultures and civilizations has come to reach unprecedented proportions, to give rise to immense problems pressing for solution . . . how to reconcile the competing claims of tradition and progress; the impact of programs of technical assistance and industrialization on pre-industrial ways of life; the question as to the minimum of common value sufficient to make possible a peaceful and mutually comprehensible intercultural relationship within a world community of different languages, religions, races, and ideologies.45
Postwar Scholarship: Context
Redfield was by no means alone in calling for the participation of intellectuals in helping to forge a new political order. From around the time of World War 11, there had been a broad-based reassertion of universalist tendencies within the US. intelligentsia.48 N o discipline could have been more fundamentally affected by such a shift than an anthropology dominated by Boasianism. T h e Morganian "comparative method," the orthodoxy of American anthropology before Franz Boas's rise to preeminence in the second decade of this century, had sought to classify the elements of different societies through reference to a unilinear, social-evolutionary classificatory system. In contrast, Boas's critique of this evolutionism had consistently upheld the importance of the cultural totality, such that its various elements' could only be properly understood in relation to that prior individuality and its specific history, rather than through what Boas saw as groundless, a priori classification. This epistemologically, and to some degree evaluatively, relativistic tendency was one of the more powerful ingredients of interwar Boasian anthropology.49 But in the face of official and "scientific" racism in Nazi Germany and the rending impact of a war to which a majority of anthropologists were more than just morally committed, followed, in turn, by increasing Cold War anxieties about Soviet expansion and nuclear apocalypse, even Ruth Benedict, a prominent Boasian activist, began to shift from her earlier position. Relativism had been all very well when it had been a question of defending racial equality and cultural pluralism, but faced with the fascist attack on liberal culture itself, it became necessary to go "beyond relativi~m."~O Late in the war, Ralph Linton's symposium on the "Science of Man in the World Crisis" displayed an overt concern that the voice of anthropology contribute to the restructuring of a new world order and the development of a Fordist regime of conscious planning. Nevertheless, relativism remained the key to acquiring useful social scientific information, and the condemnation of fascism and communism extended no further than a relativistic critique of their unacceptability "to those reared in UNESCO's activities will make even more intimate participation by anthropologists a necessity, One of the main objects of the Organization being to promote understanding between peoples, it cannot neglect the cultures which shape the thought and personality of men. As a science of culture, it is the duty of anthropology to answer the appeal of the first international organization that seeks to use all scientific means to ensure mutual understanding between p e o p l e~~"~7 As I suggested above, Redfield's reconception of area studies involved their reabsorption into the logic of the university and away from a primary concern with policy applications. H e defended a separation from the direct operations of political institutions to protect the scientific ambitions of his investigations from their being reduced to instruments of policy, power, and pragmatics.58 This prophylactic distance was crucial to his conception of the nexus of truth and freedom-the university and America-which organized his thought. In a broader sense of values-commitment, he clearly saw his project as allied with the sort of application-oriented efforts Metraux was advocating. Redfield certainly preferred the research grant to direct employment by governmental institutions, for it was only thus that he could conceptualize the university as a crucial institution underpinning the liberal values of the public sphere rather than as a pragmatic instrument for problem solving. Yet seen from a broader perspective, this did not fundamentally alter his project's participation in broader Ford Foundation efforts to "help meet the need in the United States for the knowledge and understanding of foreign areas that are required for the effective discharge of this country's increased international responsibilitie~."~~
The Civilization Concept
Redfield's own writings from the postwar period are an extended attempt to articulate the principles that underlay the civilizations project. As early as 1951, Redfield had been working on the problem of "civilization as a class," and this remained the main focus of his work for the rest of his 1ife.H) About a month before his death in 1958, he wrote to Milton Singer projecting a "small book on civilizations."6' Needless to say, the work was never com-pleted, but Redfield did leave behind three draft chapters that give us a particularly useful discussion of the neo-evolutionist framework through which the conceptual object, "civilization," was to be understood ultimately as the relationship between "great" and "little" traditions.
T h e studies Redfield published in the course of the 1950s were largely concerned with what he described as part societies: most notably, the society of the peasant, which he argued had always to be conceptualized in terms of its wider ties to urban centers and extra-village networks, as it was precisely these connections that made the peasantry peasantry rather than primitive isolates.62 His emphasis on the partiality of such societies allowed him to conceive of such societies as representing the moment of relation between more central, integrative elements of the civilizational entity and more marginal, locally integrated, folk elements. In such a way, these societies became entry-points into a consideration of the nature of these relations, and so of the total system into which they fitted. It was precisely this total system that the word "civilization" named. Back in 1950, Julian Steward had told the Social Science Research Council's Committee on World Area Research that "the nature of the area whole has not been adequately conceptualized."b' Redfield now set out to address exactly that inadequacy. What did it mean to refer to these disparate but enormously complex social systems as civilizations? How could they be thought of as a series of contiguous, formally equivalent wholes?
To begin with, when Redfield spoke of civilization, he did not have in mind the global process of the homogenization of social existence referred to as world civilization. Insofar as this new order represented the displacement of "tradition" by "modernity," it could in fact be described as "postcivilization."64 This marginalization of the global modern from Redfield's problematic might seem strange considering that it could so obviously present a sure foundation for his moral universalism. Particularly strange considering that the civilization which had been the object of his own ethnographies, that of Latin America, was by his own admission "not indigenous" but unable to be thought of apart from its invasion by Spanish and North American influences. Indeed, as Redfield pointed out in his 1950 restudy of Chan Kom, a village in Yucatan, the road to progress that that community had chosen led not to Mexico City, but to Chicago.65 Latin America was then a "secondary civilization," but there were also "primary civilizations," like those of India and China, and it was on these that he sought to model his formulations . 66 Redfield searched for a formula for a fundamentally common set of valuecommitments among the world's civilizations, but such commonality was not simply the erasing of the differences between civilizations in an assimilative, overtly colonizing moment. Rather, commonality was to be discovered within an order of difference that was in itself worthy of celebration. Redfield did not want to straightforwardly westernize the other; rather he wanted to show that the other had been striving for the same universal values that had been most fully articulated by the West, even as that other had been faithful to its historical specificity and difference. Seen as westernization, modernity could not be thought of outside of the colonialist framework that Redfield and many of his American contemporaries were trying to move away from."' No wonder he was so eager to claim that westernization and Americanization "go on now almost everywhere 'of themselves,'" and are therefore "perhaps better called 'modernization."'bg Redfield's whole project aimed to think about global difference and thereby help to negotiate and manage it. But caught in the theoretical equation of modernization with westernization, Redfield found in the historical moment of postcivilization the limit of his vision of civilizations as formally comparable entities, for this was inevitably a moment of the reinscription of America's exceptional role as the historically forward. Postcivilization implicitly frames the privilege of Redfield's voice as Western intellectual, yet at the same time, it must not be allowed to compromise the position of the West as a traditional civilizational entity. That would be to jeopardize the whole attempt to develop a conceptual framework that was not based upon an older, imperial vision of European exceptionalism, but instead, as we shall see in more detail, upon a certain modular historical narrative constitutive of the equivalence of civil i z a t i o n~.~~ T h e ecumene of ordered difference could only function if the West belonged contradictorily both within it and beyond it as its conceptualizing subject. Only by repressing the colonialist dimensions of postcivilization could Redfield's voice be that of a defender of the universal values which were the immanent telos of all the world's civilized cultures, rather than that of the inculcator of particular values demanding universal recognition.
T h e foundations of Redfield's universalism had to be discovered within the orders of difference, not just beyond them. So instead of this undifferentiated postcivilizational process, Redfield declared in the first of his draft chapters that he had in mind "those civilizations that are obviously local and ancient and yet present now. . . . Chinese, Indian, Western, Islamic-at least these -civilizations have been and still are recognizable to common sense; they are divisions or separations of long duration and considerable distinctness within humanity."70 In other words, each civilization was a discrete entity at the same time as being a member of a single class: "There is 'civilization,' but also there are separably identifiable 'civilizations.'"71 Redfield's problem then was to develop a framework that allowed for both these considerations: in other words, a comparativist framework that lined civilizations up side by side as particular but equivalent formal totalities.
Civilizations had to be thought of as wholes in order to think beyond the parts of which they are constituted, to be able to think their unity. Furthermore, they had to be thought of as formal structures in order first, to get at their quality of persistence in time, despite the ceaseless process of change (in specific content) to which history subjects all things, and, second, to be able to construct a mental object capable of being compared to other members of the same class. 72 To begin with, civilizations are only a subclass of a more inclusive category, cultures.73 Certain cultures are civilizations, and others are not. Hut this distinction between civilized and primitive cultures should not be thought of as an opposition of closed classes: Rather, the culture of any given society can be seen as fitting somewhere along a primitive-civilized continuum. In other words, instead of attempting to elaborate an absolute set of criteria for what constitutes a civilization, the relative presence of any of the relevant criteria would place a society or culture on this continuum as either more or less civilized.74 This was, in the end, a further development of Redfield's earlier conception of the folk-urban continuum, perhaps most strikingly elaborated in his Folk Culture of Yucatan, in which four communities-a city, a town, a peasant community, and a tribal village-represent spatially the temporal movement of a "social gradient in which the Spanish, modern, and urban gives way to the Maya, archaic, and ~rimitive."7~ What follows in the subsequent two draft chapters is an attempt to find a realistic framework for thinking of civilizations as whole entities rather than in terms of their parts.76 In "Civilizations as Societal Structures," Redfield discusses the approach taken by "community studies," which examine how particular communities are embedded in wider social structures and which therefore have implications for that wider unit. He envisions the extension of the method of analysis of the social structure of small communities typical of ethnographic method-the conception of "a system of social relationships between the kinds of role-fulfillers within a community that is (ordinarily) homogeneous"-to homologously constructed larger entities wherein the parts of the system are not individual role-fulfillers in a local community, but rather are "whole communities themselves, differing one from another in culture and in kind of people, or they are kinds of people seen as components within local communities and within the larger civilizational whole."77 After a discussion of various forms of analysis that he demonstrates to be inadequate to the task of thinking of a civilization as a whole, he arrives at what he sees as the promising approach of conceiving of civilizations structurally in terms of "vertical typologies." This involves the conceptualization of different types of community as positioned in persisting relations to each other within an integrative, hiel-urchicul structure headed by the "later and culminating parts" (the civilizational centers) and tailed by those most marginal to the civilization (the tribal Indians of Latin America, for example).78 T h e verticality of the typology-that is, the translation of spatial and functional difference into a temporally ordered hierarchy7~-ensures that the obvious historical depth of civilizations is incorporated into the model, rather than being effaced as in the synchronic studies of primitive communities where little evidence is available to do otherwise than leave them looking "timeless."RO In other words, a civilization incorporates within itself a historicist framework such that its synchronic structure itself embodies that civilization's own history of cultural evolution. This evolutionary narrative, furthermore, has a modular status constitutive of the civilization form itself: T h e grounds for comparability have been set. But this conception of societal structure was very general, and it was clear that some more specific formal principle would have to be isolated to provide anything like an adequate framework to guide and instruct pnrticular comparative investigations. To this end, in his third draft chapter, Redfield turns to what he calls "the structure of ideas and the products of ideas."Hl A civilization may be thought of, then, as a structure of tradition, that is, as a persisting form of arrangements for the handing down of cultural substance (idea and its products), within a great community, the community of that civilization, and as the characteristic processes for transmitting it. Just as we may think of a civilization as kinds of people in persisting forms of relationship, so we may think of it as kinds of things thought and done, with characteristic forms for communicating the substance from generation to generation, and from one part of the people to the other.8' Rut this general approach had a more specific formulation too, one which could act as an "operational concept" for comparative studies of civilization.
As we work our way along the continuum of cultures toward the civilized end, Redfield argues, we increasingly find a "large degree of distinction and separation between two aspects of knowledge," that is "between the spontaneous developments of idea in the untutored and the considered teaching of the reflective."*3 Redfield had already, in The Primitive World and its Transformations, grounded this distinction in an evolutionary narrative (drawn largely from Childe and Toynbee) that focused on the urban revolution and that posited two major social transformations. First, there emerged an elite of intellectual specialists, the literati, who reflected upon and systematized the moral order of the folk society from which they emerged. This was followed by the emergence of a new kind of intellectual elite, the intelligentsia, formed through the exposure of the literati to the influence of other cultures as a result of the social expansion following from urbanization. This second phase saw the development of a sophisticated system of thought that no longer remained organic with the source folk culture.84 This latter, fundamental transformation in the history of all civilizations allows us to conceptualize any given civilization as "an arrangement for communication between components that are universal, reflective, and indoctrinating, and components which are local, unreflective, and accepting."x5 T h e former elements, which comprised the great tradition, the core culture that radiated out from the urban centers through the sheer force of its universalistic intel-lectual achievements, thus provided the fundamental integrative principle of the civilizational unit. At the same time, the distinction between the great tradition and the little traditions (the "local, unreflective, and accepting" elements) became the formal axis around which the comparison of civilizations could be thought.86 Notably, it was only through the restoration of a unilinear, modular evolutionary narrative that the comparability of the supremely historicist category of civilization could be guaranteed.
But a question immediately presents itself. Why does Redfield need to shift from a mode of explanation centered on societal structure to the cultural problematic of the social organization of ideas to achieve what he feels to be conceptual and methodological adequacy for thinking of a civilization as a total object? After all, the structural mode of analysis is clearly a powerful tool for the integration of immense areas into societal wholes. T h e problem is that the concept of societal structure, with its implication of functional objectivity, contains little to distinguish it from civilization's more historically neutral alter ego, the area or region. It is only at the cultural moment that civilization, with its implications of historical directionality, comes fully into its own. Civilization has the vital advantage of being "a matter cf communication" to which "the geography is incidental" (though almost always correlative):H7 It thereby becomes a category that renders cultures susceptible to analysis in terms of d u e s as their ordering principle.
What, after all, is The Primitive World and its Transformations really about? Certainly it provides us with a unilinear evolutionary narrative of the passage from primitivity to civilization, but the detailed evidential substantiation of this narrative is hardly the purpose of the book. T h e evolutionary narrative it gives us is that of the passage from a unified moral order ("the organization of sentiments into judgments as to what is right") characteristic of primitive communities, to the fragmentation of the unity of this integrated moral order through the increasing importance of the technical order ("the order which results from mutual usefulness, from deliberate coercion, or from the mere utilization of the same means") with the development of civilization.88 This fragmentation results in a challenge to the civilized to reflectively reformulate and rethink the moral order, leading ultimately to the progressivist vision of modern societies that constantly and consciously seek their own rational transformation. T h e final chapter of the book, "Changing Ethical Judgment," stands then not as a reflective afterword, but as the proper culmination of what has preceded it, for the book is precisely about the problem of values in civilization seen from an anthropological perspective. Redfield had effectively offered a history of his own status as an intellectual in the world in the guise of a methodological discussion of civilization as an object of study. As early as 1947, we can see him pointing toward the argument he was now making in greater depth: "There never was a time when social science was more needed than it is today. T h e extreme peril in which we live arises from the small political and social wisdom we have in the face of our immensely dangerous material strength. We should have more control over the physical world, yes, surely; but it is far more necessary that we learn to control the relations among men."H" Relations among men was, of course, the specialty of the sciences of man. In the face of this expansion of the technical order and its erosion of the immediacy of the moral order, Redfield was staking the claim of anthropology to be able to reconstitute an ironized moral consciousness through its reflective status as a discourse of reason. In the end, the most important public service that "a great free university" performed was precisely its contribution "to strengthening certain values of the common life" of the polity, to defend the values of truth, reason, and freedom against the incursions of the pragmatics of national security, which would reduce the United States to the mirror image of its Eastern bloc enemy.'O Hut how were the privilege of anthropological knowledge and its universalistic evaluative pretensions to be guaranteed? It was none other than through the anthropologist's position as a modern social scientist at the forefront of the evolutionary narrative Redfield recounted. The anthropologist was a self-conscious member of the civilized intelligentsia permanently oriented to reflective irony rather than accepting of the great traditions that had developed out of such reflection. In other words, he was postcivilizationally aware of the parochiality of even great traditions at the same time as being admiring of their embodiment of universal values. Redfield quotes J. C. Furnas at length to underline the epistemological privilege of the histor icall y forward:
For generations the western world has bitterly blamed western man for the crime of not understanding the savage. It seems never to occur to anybody that, other things being equal, it would be equally fair to blame the savage for not understanding western man. Since that would obviously be absurd, the two sets of cultures are unmistakably on different levels, a statement that can be made without specifying higher or lower. Western man has something which neither the preliterate nor any of his ancestors possess or ever did possess, something that imposes the privilege and complicating duty of intellectual integrity, self-criticism, and generalized disinterestedness. If there is such a thing as the white man's burden, this is it.')* This "something" that the modern intellectual has is none other than the recognition of "a total trend of history which has given him an instrument for reaching truth that he regards as inherently better.""2 It is a historical transformation not just in the judgment of truth though, but also in the judgment of the good: "The moral order has been provided with measures of excellence unknown and unknowable in precivilized society."(1$ If the history of civilization is the story of the displacement of an unreflective moral order by an increasingly reflective one, the judgment of the anthropologist as civilized and postcivilized intellectual is necessarily privileged.
In other words, the evolutionist narrative guarantees not just, as has already been mentioned, the formal similarity of the various civilizations, but also the epistemological privilege of the anthropologist to analyze, compare, and evaluate them. Effectively, the West must be both civilization and postcivilization so that it can stand on the one hand as a formal equivalent among equals, and on the other hand as the privileged site of the recognition and articulation of this formal equivalency. Thus Redfield pointed to the ironic underpinnings of cultural relativism itself: "When I>r. Herskovits tells us that, with the possible exception of technological aspects, the proposition that one way of thought is better than another is exceedingly difficult to establish, he does not mean that this statement is valid only for his own culture, but he means it universally and would claim that it holds true for all people, although only those will accept it who are capable of understanding what is intended by it.'94 Even to be a cultural relativist, one must, in fact, be a crypto-universalist, precisely because one cannot do without the privileging of the anthropological discourse through which the order of difference is proclaimed. One may propose the equal moral status of every society, but even in so doing, one performatively reiterates the exceptionalness of one's own position as the conceptualizer of this equivalence. Redfield wanted to respect the historical principle of difference, but sought to show that all civilizations had in their own immanent particularity a formaZZy parallel trajectory toward the articulation of the universal values defended by the West. T h e West was thus both one of these civilizations and the privileged site for the recognition of this equivalency. The anthropologist, as the quintessential model of the intellectual who lived both within and outside of his own civilizational tradition, undertook, in Redfield's vision, the role of linchpin in the articulation and interpretation of this difference.
T h e recognition of the unity of human values-pinned to the unity of human nature-was to make global difference comprehensible to the American gaze. It confirmed to that gaze that just as the universal and the natural found expression in Western values of truth and freedom, truth and freedom were what all great traditions were aiming for. Patriot Redfield could, equally and simultaneously, also be cosmopolitan Redfield precisely because the whole of human history conspired to make the world America, the most contemporary branch of Western civilization. Redfield's wellknown avowal of the cause of world government was nothing if not the utopian political expression of the ideological nature of his whole intellectual project.95 It was the point at which the disjuncture between the West's role as both civilization and postcivilization could be resolved: Civilization, by giving birth to universal values, contained within itself the seeds of its own supersession. Redfield's project was generated, at a profound level, out "Judging from the responses at Penn and now at Stanford and Berkeley, I think our approach is both timely and influential. And is it just a coincidence that the Princeton Humanities Council asks for someone to help them develop methods of intercultural understanding that combine the social sciences and the humanities?""g In 1953, in an attempt to play the role of public intellectual, Redfield published a piece in the Saturday Review entitled ''Does America Need a Hearing Aid?" In it, he argued that the art of listening was "something that Americans need seriously to cultivate for their own safety."o0 However, we "cannot talk with other people at all understandingly, but for the fact that in some things they are like us and like everyone else."lOO Redfield's comparative civilizations project was an attempt to provide the grounding for this dialogue by showing that the basis for the global leadership role of the United States was contained within the order of cultural difference as an historical principle. But America could only fulfill its role if it could adequately negotiate these cultural differences, and this is where area studies was so crucial. If America needed a hearing aid, Redfield felt that social scientists were obliged to step into that role. in the face of anticommunist witch-hunts, which in Redfield's view were producing "an intensely partisan spirit that makes reasonable and fair discussion difficult" (Ibid. think, be conflated with the specific mode of universalism characteristic of postwar neoevolutionism.
